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P.: Abstracts of Recent Cases

ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
COURTS-FEDERAL

REMOVAL STAT

--"SEPARATE

AN

INDE-

AcrIoN" TEST.-P, a citizen of West
Virginia sued D railway, a Virginia corporation, and X and Y, citizens
of West Virginia who were employees of D, jointly, for damages in
a grade crossing collision. The action was brought in the circuit
court of Logan County, West Virginia. The declaration charged D
with negligently maintaining the crossing and X and Y with negligently operating D's train. D filed a petition for removal to the
federal court on the ground that there was a separate and independent cause of action between P, a West Virginia citizen, and D,
a Virginia corporation. P filed a motion to remand. The removal
statute provides: "Whenever a separate and independent claim or
cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is
joined with one or more otherwise nonremovable claims or causes
of action" the defendant has the right to remove the entire case to a
federal court. 62 STAT. 937 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1952).
Held, case remanded, the declaration contains but a single cause
of action. The court by looking to the West Virginia substantive
law found that P suffered only one actionable wrong for which he
was entitled to but one recovery even though there were separate
acts of negligence. "The mere multiplication of grounds of negligence does not result in multiple causes of action unless, under the
facts, there has been a violation of multiple legal rights." Brinkley v.
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 139 F. Supp. 480 (S.D. W. Va. 1956).
The principal case is another enunciation by the courts that
the congressional purpose in enacting the present removal statute
was to restrict removal from the state courts further than the
"separable controversy" test. Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 748 (1951).
PENDENT CLAIM OR CAUSE OF

M. J. P.
Fx'rumrs-SAIE OF LEAsED PREMISES TO STATE-HOusEs AND
GARAGE FoUND To BE FixTUREs.-Proceeding for declaratory judgement brought by P, a coal mining lessee, to determine the respective rights of P and D, lessor, to a certain sum of money deposited
to the joint account of P and D in a bank. The money resulted from

the sale of certain leased premises to the West Virginia Turnpike
Commission. D's predecessor leased the property to X for the purposes of mining coal. The lease provided that at its termination all
the buildings and improvements attached to the freehold shall
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revert to the lessor. X assigned the lease to Y, and Y assigned it to P,
the deed of assignment conveying "all the improvements and structures of every kind." The garage and four of the houses sold to the
Turnpike Commission were built by P, the other thirteen houses
sold having been constructed by Y. D wrote to P that the sum of
$5,458.95 was agreed upon as the price of the land to be sold to the
Turnpike Commission and that to this amount was to be added the
value of the buildings upon the land, which value P was to set.
$72,400.00 was established as the value of the improvements and
P and D agreed to sell to the Turnpike Commission the property for
$77,858.95, the proceeds to be deposited in a bank. This agreement
provided that all the rights and interests in the proceeds should be
determined under the provisions of the lease from D to X, as
amended as if the property had been taken by condemnation proceedings. The trial court found that D was entitled to the sum of
$5,458.95 and that P should recover the sum of $72,400.00. D appealed. Held, affirming the decision of the trial court, that although
the general rule states that whatever is annexed to the soil becomes
a part of it, and can only be removed by the person who owns the
freehold, there is an exception to the effect that fixtures erected for
the purposes of trade or business are personalty and are removable
by the tenant during his term. The form or size of the improvement
is of no significance. The sole question is one of fact as to the
intention of the lessee in attacking the property, i.e., as to whether
it was designed for the purposes of trade, or whether it was for the
purpose of increasing the value of the land. The court, by looking
to all of the letters and agreements, determined that the purpose
was for trade and therefore temporary. Milburn By-Products Co. v.
Eagle Land Co., 93 S.E.2d 231 (W. Va. 1956).
There are three general tests to determine whether an improvement is a fixture or not: "First, annexation to the realty, either
actual or constructive; second, adaptation or application to the use
or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is connected
is appropriated; and third, intention to make the article a permanent
accession to the freehold." Annot., 77 A.L.R. 1400 (1932). The
factual situation often determines how these tests will be applied;
but the intention of the party making the annexation is usually the
controlling consideration. The court in the principal case found
that the intention of the party making the annexation was the deciding factor and looked to the facts and circumstances to find out
M. J. P.
what such intention was.
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INSuRANCE-INSURER'S AT
vp='rw CANCELLATION OF Aurro LiABILITY POLICY BY MAm INEFFEcnvE.-D insurance company issued
an auto liability policy to X, a member of the United States Air
Force, for a period commencing on December 28, 1954, and ending
on December 28, 1955. X's address on the date of issuance was Hill
Air Force Base, Utah. This address was inscribed on the face of the
policy and was never changed. The policy was in the usual form
and contained a provision that the "policy may be cancelled by the
company by mailing to the named insured at the address shown in
this policy, written notice stating when, not less than five days thereafter such cancellation shall be effective. The mailing of notice as
aforesaid shall be sufficient proof of notice." On January 11, 1955,
X received orders transferring him to Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, and he departed on or about that date. He was to report to
his new base on February 18, 1955. On January 21, 1955, D's agent
in Utah was informed by personnel at Hill Air Force Base that X
was transferred to Langley Air Force Base, effective as of that date.
On January 25, 1955, D mailed a registered letter, addressed to X
at Langley Air Force Base, containing a notice of cancellation to be
effective on February 4, 1955. This letter reached Langley Air Force
Base on January 28, 1955, but was returned undelivered on February
11, 1955. On February 4, 1955, X while driving in the state of West
Virginia was killed in an auto accident, as a result of which A and B
were injured. Due to his untimely death, X never received the letter
of cancellation. In this action A and B are suing D, the insurer. The
issue here is -whether D effectively cancelled the policy before the
accident occurred. Held, that D failed to strictly follow the cancellation provision of the policy, and since X did not receive notice
of the attempted cancellation, the policy was still in force. "In the
absence of a stipulation to the contrary, the act of cancelling a contract which provides for cancellation on notice necessarily includes
the element of delivery of the notice." Although the parties to an
insurance policy can "provide that mailing shall be sufficient proof
of delivery, the party seeking to take advantage of such a provision
must show a strict compliance with the terms of the contract, or
display some valid reason for non-compliance." D claimed since
they received knowledge of Xs change of address, notice to the
address prescribed in the policy would have been a fruitless act.
The court found, however, that X never notified D of any change of
address. Even if there were no accident X would not have received
the notice until February 18, 1955, the day he was to report. While
if D had inquired at Hill Air Force Base, it is probable that it would
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have been informed of the address at which X could have been
reached while on leave. In the event that notice were sent to the
address in the policy, it likely would have been forwarded to X at
his home address. Therefore, since it was not mailed to X's address
as shown in the policy the notice of cancellation was ineffective.
Wright v. Columbia Casualty Co., 137 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. W. Va.
1956).
On appeal, decision for the plaintiffs was affirmed, the court
stating that strict compliance with the contract was necessary to
cancel the policy. If the notice was mailed to the address shown in
the policy, the defendant having no knowledge of any change of
address, the actual receipt of the notice by the insured would not
be essential for cancellation. In the principal case because the notice
was mailed to an address not provided for in the policy, actual receipt
on the part of X was mandatory. If however, the defendant received
notice from the insured of a change in his address, the cancellation
would have to be mailed to the new address to be effective. Columbia Casualty Co. v. Wright, 235 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1956).
The question of cancellation of insurance policies by mail has
been frequently litigated. There are many divergent decisions due
to variations in the facts, provisions in the policies and the effect of
statutes. Annot., 128 A.L.R. 1008 (1939); 29 Am. JuR., Insurance
§ 285 (1940).
M. J. P.
TtADE-MAIKS AND TPADE-NAmES - UNFAm COMPmTrION SwrrcH SELUNG MELEOD - D ENJOINED AND HELD LIABLE FOR rrs

PNOrrTs. - P, Admiral Corporation, brought an action for an injunction and damages against D corporation and three of its officers,
A, B, and C. The complaint charged infringement of P's registered
trade-mark "Admiral" and unfair competition, by selling electric
vacuum cleaners and sewing machines under the name "Admiral".
P manufactures and sells, under the name "Admiral", a number of
household appliances. "Admiral" is a registered trade-mark for its
appliances, but not for vacuum cleaners or sewing machines, which
it does not handle. By expending millions of dollars, P has publicized
this name so that it is known to the public favorably. D used the
"switch" selling method. It would advertise used vacuum cleaners
and sewing machines of well known makes, at low prices, to get in
touch with possible buyers. D's salesmen would then show the
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prospect "beat up" appliances and then try to sell him a new machine
bearing the name "Admiral", often deliberately creating the impression that P was the manufacturer of these goods. In short D was
palming off these appliances as products of P. The pertinent statute
provides that when a defendant infringes upon a registered trademark, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover: "(1) defendant's
profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the
costs of the action." 60 STAT. 439 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1952).
Held, injunction granted and D, and A, the president of D, are liable
for profits. A made the decision to use the name "Admiral", while
B and C had no active part in the management of the corporation
and therefore are not liable. P, even though it did not manufacture
vacuum cleaners and sewing machines, recovered the profits of
D. A was liable for the share of his income that could be fairly
attributed to the sales of "Admiral" products. He, being the directing head, was as much at fault as D. Admiral Corp. v. Price Vacuum
Stores, 141 F. Supp. 796 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
The principal decision takes the profit out of palming-off goods
as those of another by the use of the "switch" selling method, thereby
protecting the complainant, and also protecting the public. It follows
the modem trend in finding that competition is no longer the essential test. The emphasis is now placed upon the injury suffered by
the plaintiff and the public from the confusion resulting from the
defendant's acts. Annot., 148 A.L.R. 12 (1944).
M. J. P.
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